Balkanalysis.com editor’s note: Greek public interest in matters of espionage and wiretapping were revived earlier this month when judicial authorities filed charges of attempted espionage against unnamed suspects, following a lengthy investigation into a 2004 wiretapping scandal in which phones used by former Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, several other ministers, and other prominent persons were found to have been illegally tapped. The miscreants had manipulated hardware made by Ericsson to intrude on Greece’s domestic Vodafone network; both companies were fined in 2007 over the case. (For context, readers are referred to Balkanalysis.com’s February 2006 coverage of the matter).
Considering the revived interest in the topic, we are pleased to be able to offer the following new account of the technological investments made by Greek security agencies in recent years- while also discussing the legal provisions under which such bodies are controlled, and the little-mentioned place of criminals, detectives and even ordinary citizens in the acquisition of such equipment.
By Ioannis Michaletos in Athens
Over the past decade, Greece’s National Intelligence Service (in Greek, Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion or EYP) has considerably upgraded its technological means regarding communications surveillance and monitoring, while also moving to follow the practices of partner agencies from NATO states, especially the American and German ones. One key function desired by the Greek agency has been to acquire the ability, like their peers, of conducting massive SIGINT operations both abroad and in the homeland.
This trend has provoked calls for more legal oversight, especially as regards the extent and justification of NIS wiretapping jurisdiction. (In February 2008, Balkanalysis.com covered the new procedural and structural changes accompanying legislation on NIS activities and competencies). At the same time, the increasing availability of reasonably sophisticated technological gear on the open market has made it possible for everyone from ordinary citizens to organized crime entities to acquire equipment for purposes both predatorial and defensive.
The proliferation of transnational organized crime networks, and the increasingly complex variety of participants and facilitators involved with them, means that intelligence and security services must rely more and more on high-end electronic means of intelligence gathering, since the whole process is being accelerated and, at the same time human resources are simply inadequate. In Greece, technology is being called on more and more to help deal with a wide range of domestic threats such as criminal gangs, illegal immigration, contraband weapons, espionage, terrorism, extremist political groups and other so-called ‘asymmetrical threats’ to society. These threats can also in some cases have a negative impact on social cohesion and political-economical stability.
Technological Upgrades for the National Intelligence Service: A Brief Recap
The NIS started to modernize its systems chiefly because of the 2004 Olympic Games, in the years previous to that event. New surveillance machinery was acquired and an open intelligence gathering centre was established. It was set up to have analysts on duty round the clock, persons who would be monitoring all security developments in a range of sectors and regions. An important aspect here was the partnership of NIS with foreign agencies, in order for it to acquire know-how. This was primarily achieved by joint exercises and seminars with mostly the USA, UK and France, and with certain other countries.
After the end of the Olympic Games, homeland threats seemed to expand in Greece, and especially those related to transnational organized crime involved in human trafficking and weapons and narcotics smuggling. This led NIS to further expand its SIGINT capabilities, first of all by acquiring a surveillance system from a German company, Syborg. The 2008 law gave NIS a mandate in regards to such types of security, though it is not completely clear to what extent they have taken advantage of it, and to what extent they have left such areas up to the jurisdiction of the Hellenic Police.
The Syborg system, estimated to have cost some 10 million euros, reportedly has the capability of simultaneously monitoring around 6,000 telephone lines (either fixed or mobile). The system has 60-80 work stations and a large number of terminals in several locations across Greece, and has the ability of being permanently embedded in the telephone and internet lines of all Greek telecom companies, thus being able to be activated instantly whenever the order is given.
In parallel with telephone communications, the intercept system can also monitor some 2,000 internet connections simultaneously, and has the overall ability of monitoring all kinds of communication (voice, SMS, MMS, e-mail, fax) and to locate IP’s, as well as the exact location of mobile phone holders, even if they have their phone closed. According to Greek reports on that issue, at least 25 major criminal cases have been solved over the past three years by NIS (in cooperation with police directorates), chiefly thanks to the capabilities of the Syborg system.
In addition, the NIS possesses tens of ‘suitcase surveillance stations.’ These relatively inexpensive portable surveillance systems can monitor a few dozen telecom lines in parallel across the land and are operated by very small teams of people. Analytic tools using specialized software are working in parallel (through the use of analysts), and through the data extracted by the surveillance can in a very short period generate a ‘sociograph’ of all criminal parties involved.
In essence this tremendously speeds up investigative work, since with it detective work that could take up to a year can now be executed within just a few hours. Similar systems have also been acquired by other agencies in Greece, such as the Hellenic Police and the Military Intelligence corps.
Other systems or equipment now being operated by the NIS have been acquired from American, Israeli, British and Swiss corporations. Most of the relevant machinery here costs far less than the comprehensive Syborg system; for instance, a certain portable surveillance system acquired cost around 50,000 euros, while a simple system that can only monitor one specific phone from a 200-meter range cost less than 2,000 euros.
Lastly, new NIS software being used for ‘linkanalysis’ and generating the above-mentioned sociographs was purchased from the British firm i2. The company was widely referenced in world media in late August 2011, when IBM announced plans to acquire it from California-based private equity firm Silver Lake Sumeru, which has a portfolio of investments in “middle-market technology companies.” Reporting that the deal would be worth an estimated $500 million, the Financial Times added that “i2’s pattern recognition software is used by 25 of the 28 Nato members to sift through military intelligence and helps police forces with tasks such as tracking missing persons.” The newspaper noted that the Cambridge-based company “has more than 4,500 customers in 150 countries.” The i2 software purchased by NIS is also used by Britain’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and costs a few thousand euros.
The NIS’ Legal and Operational Framework, Human Resources and Areas of Interest
The National Intelligence Service’s activities are governed by a series of laws, the latest one having been voted in by the Greek parliament in 2008 (Law 3649/2008). In it, eight basic areas regarding NIS’s responsibilities were set out or reaffirmed.
The agency’s first responsibility, according to the law, is the gathering, analysis and distribution of intelligence regarding national security and national interests. Secondly, the NIS has responsibilities for gathering intelligence on organized crime, terrorism, WMD proliferation, human trafficking, narcotics and any type of serious criminality, including money laundering.
Third, the NIS is tasked with coordination of the intelligence work of other agencies of a similar nature in the country, as well as undertaking counter-espionage responsibilities.
Other duties include assistance in crisis management intelligence to all state bodies as required by the state authorities, and assistance in intelligence capabilities to the Armed Forces as needed. According to the 2008 law, the NIS is also required to forge and maintain partnerships with foreign services and international organizations for topics of mutual interest. Finally, the NIS is required to report on incidents, trends and developments as requested by state authorities.
On the personnel level, the human resources of NIS are composed of a wide variety of people, who have from secondary up to post-doc levels of education. These are divided into civil personnel, specialized scientific personnel, technical personnel, secondary personnel, military personnel of all ranks, as well as Police, Coast Guard and fire service personnel. The human resources encompass in most respects all the stratums of the Greek society. Agents being handled may come from all sectors of social, business, and political life in the country and internationally, since NIS is both an espionage and counter-intelligence service: in this respect it is one of the few single organizations to have such an extensive reach of responsibilities and assignments in the world.
Due to Greece’s specific national interests, the NIS is especially active in the region between Central Europe and the Middle East, and it is estimated further that the agency has extensive capabilities facilitated amongst other by the global spread of the Greek Diaspora, the reach of Greek-owned maritime businesses, the participation of the country in all leading international organizations, its alliances with countries located in sensitive regions, the important incoming tourism flow in Greece annually, and the ideal location of the country as an in-between commercial center from the EU to the Middle East concerning all types of trade businesses (legal and illegal alike).
Lastly, the rather large office corps (compared to the size of the country) in the Greek armed forces and police, along with the international experiences and foreign language training of a considerable number of Greek citizens (due to previous immigration or studies abroad), provides the NIS with ample human resources either as permanent personnel, as informal assets, or as intermediaries for foreign nationals to be used as intelligence sources.
However, despite the apparent wealth of human resources, a Western technology expert with knowledge of the matter tells Balkanalysis.com that “they [the NIS] do not have enough competent persons trained in how to use the new machinery, and thus not all of the equipment is even being used at the moment.”
Who’s Getting Tapped, and How? Increasing Surveillance and Parliamentary Oversight
When moving to consider the full significance of the National Intelligence Service’s acquisition of more surveillance technology in recent years, some context must be established first. In the late 1960’s, Greece suffered a military coup and subsequently six years of harsh martial law. The plot was orchestrated by career military personnel heavily involved with the then-KYP (renamed EYP/NIS in 1983).
From the 1950′s through the early 1970′s the telecommunications of all politicians and prominent individuals in Greece were under constant monitoring. During that era, it was obvious that the country’s political leadership could not enforce legality and was unable to oversee even the day-to-day operations of the KYP; it was considered as the ‘long arm’ of the ‘old pre-1975 CIA’ in Greece and was stuffed with Greek-American agents who had acquired authorities far greater than their official position. After the restoration of democracy and overthrow of the junta, steps were made to rein in the powers of the rogue intelligence service.
Due to this traumatic past, a healthy distrust of authority remains firmly embedded in Greece, and especially among left-wing and anarchist groups opposed to any sort of state scrutiny. This situation partly explains why the issue of wiretapping remains politically volatile. According to Greek law, there are two manners under which a phone can be tapped: through a judicial council decision by the magistrates court (known in Greek as the voulevma) or for reasons of national security (according to the 1994 Law No. 2225), for which only the agreement of the district attorney is needed, through a simple execution order. Obviously the second way gets faster results.
According to a report by the Greek daily To Vima, in 2010 there were 3,450 surveillance cases in Greece, whereas they were 2,031 cases in 2009, showing a rapid increase. Moreover, there were 2,281 orders made by state attorneys for surveillance for reasons of national security, whereas 1,169 surveillance orders had been given by the voulevma procedure. In contrast, as recently as 2005, the total cumulative annual surveillance orders in Greece came to a mere 199.
The results so far are fascinating: in the first six months of 2011 alone, 220 indictments against members of organized crime were handed out and at least 60 members of racketeering networks were arrested. A series of important cases have been investigated, including that of a nationwide betting scandal involving prominent figures in Greece, high-profile busts against foreign gangs importing hundreds of kilos of cocaine or heroin, and the break-up of substantial number of protection rackets against commercial businesses.
The NIS also has assigned to it a state attorney, who monitors the progress and outcome of these surveillance cases. Further, the Greek state has also assigned an independent body, the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (in Greek, Archi Diasfalisis tou Aporritou ton Epikoinownion, or ADAE) which makes technical assessments on the legality of every act of surveillance. The Greek Parliament also retains oversight authority through its bipartisan Institutions and Transparency Committee.
Nevertheless in a bureaucratic environment where power tends to become rather absolute through the use of technology and in a clandestine manner, oversight has to be made thoroughly, and on a primary level.
Speaking off-the-record for Balkanalysis.com, a police security analyst in Athens notes that “the actual responsibility regarding oversight, and in simple terms the service performing its tasks in a legal manner, rests with the political personnel of the Ministry of Public Order (Citizen’s Protection Ministry, as of 2010), the Minister, the alternate minister, their advisors and most importantly their own bureaucratic ‘people’ within the agency. If a minister and his staff are politically and personally strong enough they can be the guarantors of legality, otherwise it is difficult enough to assure the Parliament and the public in general that illegal telephone taps are not being made. It all comes down to the personal authority and connections that the political personnel assigned to national security issues have.”
Additionally, the foreign technology expert adds that, in addition to its perennial focus on Turkey, the NIS is listening in to “certain EU officials, and anyone who is or might be related to the IMF and World Bank”- a plausible scenario, considering the important role at the moment of such foreign lenders in the high-stakes game of resolving Greece’s financial problems.
Competition with the State: Off-the-shelf and Online Purchasing of Spy Gear in Greece
Distant but lingering memories of Greece’s oppressive legacy, an awareness of increasing state surveillance, and the new availability of relatively sophisticated machinery in shops and online are leading ordinary Greeks to purchase more surveillance and counter-surveillance equipment than ever before. While specialist shops exist in Athens and other large cities, one can actually buy much of the desired gear over the internet- a simple search is enough for many Greeks to embark on their quest for technological parity with the state.
For more specialized equipment, there are dedicated importers. In general, all of the major companies in Athens dealing with security installations possess items ranging from a simple CCTV system up to computer programs and other surveillance equipment- goods which according to Greek law are illegal to use but legal to buy!
One prominent established market for surveillance and counter-surveillance equipment in Greece can be found with the country’s private detective sector, from small-time operators to the five or six best-known firms. The latter have the most sophisticated equipment in their inventory, but officially do not engage in any ‘illegal surveillance’- though it is a public secret that they do. Greek private investigators do not have better systems than the National Intelligence Service or Hellenic Police forces, because the really high-tech systems are expensive to buy and operate. However, the sleuths do have extensive capabilities of monitoring particularly.
http://liarcatchers.com/electronic_surveillance.html
Most systems acquired in Greece come from companies in the USA, UK, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Switzerland and France, but some are also contraband or patent-busting equipment produced in Russia, Serbia and Bulgaria.
In Greece, regular citizens who are really interested in buying such stuff tend to follow two methods: either by going discreetly through an acquaintance or other intermediary who works in or is connected to the police or private investigation sector; or by going directly to a dealer and asking for the ‘hot stuff,’ provided he pays in cash. Almost all serious security electronic dealers are located in central Athens.
While most such buyers do not aspire to compete with or cross paths with the Greek security services, some do- primarily, mobsters intent on using counter-surveillance devices in order to check if their phone is being tapped or to perform ‘electronic sweeps’ for bugs on their premises. This is regarded as a necessary protective measure for criminals wishing to stay out of the clutches of the law.
In addition, plenty of inexpensive monitoring devices are sold in Greece to individuals, mostly businesspeople, private detectives and other curious people. In this respect, it is common knowledge in Greece, as elsewhere in the world, that telecom surveillance is widespread and encompasses a considerable portions of the Greek society’ perhaps tens of thousands of people are being monitored annually, apart from the judicially-ordered and state-executed acts of surveillance.
